7-14-1957

The Next Stage in Foreign Policy

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
For Release A.M.'s Sunday, July 14, 1957

FILE COPY

THE NEXT STAGE IN FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. President:

With the 1st Session of the 85th Congress moving into the closing weeks, I ask the indulgence of the Senate for another general review of the nation's foreign policy. As the Senate knows, I have set forth from time to time in this body views on the international situation. I have made these periodic statements because I believe it is mutually helpful when Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations share their observations with other Members of the Senate. I know that my own understanding has been enriched by the discussions which have sometimes followed these statements. It may be that the Executive Branch has profited from them in the same manner.

Most important, Mr. President, I have made these statements because of the vast significance that foreign policy has assumed in the lives of the people of the United States. The citizens of this country have a right to expect whatever information we can provide in this matter, whatever light we may be able to shed on the international situation as it confronts the nation. They have the right to expect a deep and continuing interest on the part of the Senate in questions of foreign policy.

The State of Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 85th Congress

At the outset of this Session, on January 30, I addressed this body at length on the matter to which I return today. It seemed to me at that time - after

the near disaster at Suez - that the President was in great need of support on foreign policy from outside the confines of the White House and the executive agencies.

The nation's foreign policy was fast degenerating into a hodge-podge of sterile slogans and fumbling fears. There were many - passionate words, religious words, frightened and frightening words and peaceful words. Yet there was little action to reflect the more worthy of these words. The nobler policy became in the language of its expression, the more meaningless it was becoming in the pattern of its operation. Foreign policy lacked effective and consistent leadership and it lacked strength of conviction on the part of those charged with day-to-day operations. There was a tendency on the part of the Executive Branch to hoard power and to reach out for ever-increasing power in foreign relations. At the same time, that Branch seemed ever more desirous of evading the responsibilities of its already vast powers in this field.

The effects of this degeneration in foreign policy were readily apparent last January. Abroad, it contributed in the Middle East to what the Secretary of State called the most serious threat to peace in a decade. Yet just a short time before, the nation had been assured that the situation in that area was improving. The degeneration endangered our relations with the democratic nations of Western Europe. Yet, the future of freedom and peace depended heavily on cooperation with those nations. In Eastern Europe the degeneration immobilized policy at a critical juncture of developments. As for the Far East, the Executive Branch kept the curtain of ignorance high in this country with an arbitrary arrogance towards

the Press unprecedented in recent history. Yet it did so at a time when events in that region were moving in a manner which was driving the United States increasingly into an isolated position. Only Africa appeared not to be adversely affected. In the light of experience elsewhere, however, there was reason to wonder how long this fortunate circumstance would persist.

At home, the degeneration of policy, imperiled mutual restraint between the political parties and between the Executive and Legislative Branches. It gave rise to a serious loss of confidence in the course of our foreign policy among the people of the United States. Yet the safety of the nation depended on close unity between the parties and the branches of the government and an intelligent concern in our relationships with the rest of the world on the part of the public.

The need, at the beginning of this session, therefore, was clearly for a new contribution, a constructive contribution to the course of our relations with other nations. It seemed to me that such a contribution was required of both parties. It was required of the Congress - particularly of the Senate.

In my remarks on January 30th, therefore, I urged Members of this body, on both sides of the aisle, to make that contribution. I urged that the President be provided freely with <u>responsible</u> <u>cooperation</u> in foreign relations. I made clear that as far as the Democratic majority was concerned that would be our approach. I expressed the hope that the same cooperation would be forthcoming from the Republican minority and the Republican Administration. What other course was possible? How else were the vital interests of the nation, beyond party interests, to be safeguarded in this nuclear age?

The Contribution of the Senate to Foreign Policy

During the months of the current session, the Senate - both parties in the Senate - have made the contribution that was so desperately needed. This body has introduced an initiative into foreign policy where little existed at the beginning of the year. It has provided new ideas, new direction where before there was only a timorous clinging to outmoded policies of the past and, sometimes, in the "brink of war" episodes, a dangerous distortion of those policies. It has produced some order out of the administrative chaos into which the conduct of foreign policy had been reduced by the multiple agencies and voices of the Executive Branch. While the Senate refrained from interference with the essential authority of the President in foreign relations, it has illuminated more clearly the Constitutional limitations and responsibilities which must go with that authority.

We can begin to see the results of this contribution. We can see these results in the Middle East where, at least for the moment, a measure of calm prevails. The work of the Senate was a major factor in inducing that development. This body gave the President the tools he asked for to deal with the situation in tha region. It gave him the tools, however, only after having tried to make certain th they would not be misused by the Executive Branch.

What the Senate did was to remove the press agentry from the Administra tion's approach to the grave problem of the Middle East. Had the resolution the President proposed been adopted by the Senate under the whip of urgency and in the fanfare of crisis with which it was presented, had it been adopted without the changes which the Senate made after full consideration of its implications, there is no telling what the consequences might have been.

In its original form, the Middle East resolution was an invitation to irresponsible action by the Executive Branch. It was an arrangement whereby authority to commit this country to war was delegated to that Branch while responsibility for war, if it came, would have been consigned to the Congress. It was a blank check for military and economic aid. It invited reckless use of this delicate and costly instrument of policy. In its original form the resolution gave lip-service support to the United Nations where that body was least able to act effectively. Yet that organization was overlooked where it could perform and was performing, through the emergency force in the Middle East, a most useful function in the maintenance of peace.

The changes made by the Senate removed these weaknesses from the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine. By linking responsibility with authority, the action of the Senate helped to make certain that the military power of the United States would be used with great caution by the Executive Branch. It helped to insure that in an anxiety to avoid war, that Branch did not stumble into war. By compelling a prompt accounting on expenditures for economic and military aid, the Senate minimized the liklihood of a profligate or careless use of that aid. By emphasizing support for the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East, the changes made by the Senate did more than give a ritualistic nod to the United Nations. They made clear that when that organization could perform a genuine service for peace, the people of this country stood firmly behind its efforts.

In the field of foreign aid, the work of the Senate and its Committees broke through the curtain of administrative complexity that had come to conceal the decay in this most important instrument of foreign policy. The Senate laid the groundwork for a thorough-going revision of a multi-billion dollar program which had been rapidly losing friends abroad and support at home. By an expenditure of less than three hundred thousand dollars in an extensive study of foreign aid, the Senate has already stimulated the saving of hundreds of millions of dollars of public funds. I am confident, moreover, that additional funds will be saved in the future. What is more important, these savings will not impair but are likely to enhance the usefulness of foreign aid in foreign policy.

In the case of the information program, the Senate's contribution was to join with the House in curbing a vast expansion that had been planned by the Executive Branch. By cutting the proposed budget of the Information Agency, the Senate was applying what is, apparently, the only remedy capable of excising the delusion of grandeur which periodically seizes this operation.

Time and again, we have seen the adverse repercussions of overseas informational activities on such a scale as to suggest a cultural offensive on the part of this nation. Time and again, the point has been made that there is a place for an information program in the conduct of foreign policy but that it cannot substitute for policy, no matter how great the output of words, no matter how astute the gimmicks. Time and again, Members of Congress have stressed that the finest ideals of this nation ought not to be sold like some mass-produced product, in the political market-places of the world.

Yet, time and again, the obvious has been ignored. Time and again, the agency bulges with the grandiose belief that it has a short-cut, low-cost, sure-fire formula which will win us friends, stop communism and bring about a secure peace, if only the appropriations are large enough. I must say that the White House did more to encourage that delusion this year than ever before.

In these circumstances, Mr. President, the Congress was compelled to curb the activity by the only recourse open at this time - that of drastic budget cutting. Congress had to take that step, not merely as a matter of economy but in order to preserve the utility of the program. If an information service has any use at all and I believe that it has a highly important one, it is as an instrument for communicating to others an honest understanding of the policies of the United States and an accurate and reasonable image of its people. The Program will not serve this purpose effectively unless it is operated with a rational restraint and with a decent respect for the cultural privacy of other nations. It will not serve this purpose unless the nation's foreign policies are sound to begin with and the program is closely integrated with these policies in their inception and operation.

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to mention in connection with the work of the current session, the ratification of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This treaty represents the beginning of a worldwide effort to unfold the peaceful possibilities and to curb the dangers inherent in this great new source of energy. By consenting to ratification of the Statute, the Senate has risen to a great challenge. I trust that the Executive Branch shall act under this Treaty, with a prudence which will justify the faith that has been reposed in the President.

May I say that such delays as were encountered in the ratification of the Treaty, while the Senate devised Constitutional safeguards, might have been avoided had the advice of this body been sought before the proposal was made to the world. Again, however, the restless eagerness of the public relations experts apparently took precedence over the preparation of sound policy.

The matters which I have been discussing to this point, Mr. President, are the most tangible results, the most significant legislative results of this session's work in foreign relations. Members of the Senate have made other contributions, less tangible perhaps but which, in the long run, may have the most far-reaching and beneficial results.

How, for example, can we estimate the contribution of the distinguished majority leader /Mr. Johnson/ and the distinguished minority leader /Mr. Knowland/ or the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations /Mr. Green/ and the ranking minority member /Mr. Wiley/ in keeping politics out of foreign affairs in the Senate, in keeping the preponderant national interest constantly in perspective?

How can we estimate the contribution of the Senator from Arkansas /Mr. Fulbright/ and the Senator from Minnesota /Mr. Humphrey/ in compelling a more rational approach to the situation in the Middle East? What may result in the years ahead from the brilliant dissents on foreign aid policy, the dissents of the Senator from Georgia /Mr. Russell/ the Senator from Oregon /Mr. Morse/ and the Senator from Louisiana /Mr. Long/? What effect did the logic of the Senator

from Massachusetts /Mr. Kennedy/ have in stimulating the beginnings of a policy on Poland and Eastern Europe? What of the contribution of the Senator from Iowa /Mr. Hickenlooper/ and the minority leader /Mr. Knowland/ in safeguarding the powers of the Senate in connection with the Atomic Energy Statute? What of the initiative of the majority leader /Mr. Johnson/ with respect to the over-all problems of United States relations with Soviet Russia?

And how can we estimate the influence of the many Members of the Senate, of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, who raised the question of the implications of testing nuclear weapons? This generation and the generations to come may owe an incalculable debt to the Senator from New Mexico /Mr. Anderson/ the Senator from Rhode Island /Mr. Pastore/ and the Senator from Tennessee /Mr. Gore/ and others. These Senators brought this grave question into the light of public discussion while the Executive Branch dawdled with it in the darkness of the secrecy-shrouded Atomic Energy Commission. The contribution of these Members to our understanding of the problems of nuclear weapons and of others on other international problems can be summed up in a sentence. They have had the courage to look at the realities of the international situation and to speak out on these realities. In so doing, they have provided new ideas which have found or are likely to find their way into the nation's foreign policy. In so doing, they have provided the initiative which was desperately needed by the Executive Branch to stop the drift towards national disaster.

We are ending the session, Mr. President, with a more effective and a more economical foreign policy. We are ending it with policies which provide a

better outlook for peace. The Senate has contributed a great deal to this department. In recent months, there has been every evidence that the President and the Secretary of State have come more and more to see its necessity and advantage.

The Present State of Foreign Relations

It would be easy to overstress the achievements. Let me repeat, therefore, that what has been obtained during this session is only a better outlook for peace, not peace itself. We have checked the descent into international chaos but we are only at the beginning of the ascent towards international stability.

We have still to reexamine the many aspects of the present mechanics of policy and policy itself in the penetrating light of Senatorial and public review. The improvements of the past few months will quickly prove illusory unless we act to maintain and extend them.

At home, we are still confronted with the need to develop enduring practices not only of bi-partisanship but of what may more properly be termed, tripartisanship. Apart from the need for the responsible restraints of bi-partisanship between the two parties, there is a need for continuing arrangements which provide a third factor - responsible cooperation between the President and the Congress.

We have still to improve the operations of the foreign aid and information programs and to coordinate these and other undertakings abroad more closely with foreign policy.

Abroad, we have obtained only a momentary breathing spell in the international situation, and this, I emphasize, is not to be equated with peace. There has been only a limited recovery in cooperation with the Western democracies after the breakdown at Suez. The division of Germany still haunts the future of Europe. With respect to Western Europe, we have yet to formulate an understanding of how best to relate our national interests to the European unity that appears to be emerging in the plans of Euratom and the European Common Market. We have only begun to grope with the changes in the situation in Eastern Europe. For the Far East, policy remains imprisoned in the past while events move that region rapidly into a new era. In the Middle East, there is still only a tenuous truce. We have still to go beyond words and establish in practice sound relations with the new nations of Asia and Africa. We have still to advance the concept of hemispheric cooperation to a higher ground of common interest with the nations of Latin America.

Finally, Mr. President, we need still to explore the whole scope of relations with the Soviet Union, with a view to lessening the threat and dangers of nuclear war. A temporary standstill agreement on nuclear testing, even if it were obtained might reduce a health hazard to the human race. It would not, however, end the possibility of the sudden death of civilization.

A New Stage in Foreign Policy

Where do we turn next, Mr. President? As I have noted, we now have a kind of holding action for peace. That is an important achievement but we cannot ignore the fact that a holding action is not forever. The situation in the world does

not stand still. International events flow continuously and we shall either advance with them or be submerged in their backwash. We shall either move towards greater instability or towards greater security for all nations.

That is why, Mr. President, I believe we must ask ourselves whether the time is not becoming ripe to move forward from a holding action towards the consolidation of peace. I am aware, Mr. President, that it is beyond the power of this country alone to determine whether or not there shall be peace. But it is also beyond the power of the Soviet Union alone or any nation alone. There are some matters which do not rest in the hands of men or nations. What does lie within the realm of all nations, however, is to establish the kind of policies which will permit peace, if, in fact, the opportunity to make it is given to us.

It has been said many times, and correctly, that there will be no peace unless there is a change in the attitudes of the Soviet Union. It has not been said, yet, it must be said, that peace also depends on the attitudes which underlie our own policy.

The attitudes which shape policy, Mr. President, are human attitudes. Because they are, policy is a mixture of the able and the inept, of the generous and the selfish, of the courageous and of the fearful. But for too long, Mr. President, I believe policy as designed by the Executive Branch has reflected too heavily the fearful. To be sure, we have had the courageous words, the able words, and the generous words. Yet the Executive Branch has turned too often to fear to find justification for the actions it pursues or fails to pursue.

There is fear in this country, but there is also a fullness of spirit that permits us to deal honestly and confidently with the realities of the world, if we will. A policy which emphasizes the fear and ignores this spirit does not do justice to the people of the United States. It serves neither our traditions nor our interests

I shall speak frankly on this point because time is running out on peace. We shall either face the issue squarely now or history -- if, in fact, there is anyone left to write it -- history may well be at a loss to explain to succeeding generations how the leadership of the present generation sacrificed the greatness of this nation on an altar of irresponsible fear.

I ask the Senate, Mr. President, to think back through recent years to the major issues of foreign policy which have come before this body - think back to the Treaties of Peace, to Mutual Security, to N.A.T.O., to the Information program, to the innumerable aid-programs which we have considered, to the most recent measures - the Middle East resolution and even to the Atomic Energy Agency Statute. Most of these measures were generous in original design. Many of them were acts of great courage and foresight. Most of them, in short, had high constructive merit, in terms of our national interests and ideals, in terms of world peace, in terms of universal freedom.

Yet, were they allowed to stand primarily on this merit? Were they allowed to reflect in full measure the finest attitudes of the people of the United States? Or was not the grim spectre soon raised in justification of all of them? The grim spectre of the advantage which would fall to communism if we did not act in some particular fashion or other? And has it not been raised again and again? Indeed has not that motivation, that motivation of fear, almost invariably

been turned into the principal motivation for any major action of policy? The fact is that it has been made to swamp virtually every other consideration.

We may well ask ourselves whether or not that is the principal reason why the policies of the nation are looked upon so often as essentially negative; why it has seemed for years that in the arena of world affairs the Russians act and this country merely reacts. We may well ask ourselves whether or not that is the principal reason why after the expenditure of $60 billion on foreign aid and hundreds of billions on defense, security still eludes us; why a sense of living on the edge of doom has not ceased to haunt the nation.

We may even ask ourselves whether a policy derived so heavily from this attitude of fear is adjusted to the dimensions of the actual Soviet threat. If it is not, if policy has been geared instead to dimensions swollen by a stimulated fear, Mr. President, then the people of the United States have paid and shall continue to pay an unnessary tribute of billions of dollars to this fear. We may yet pay for it with the lives of millions of citizens.

This Senate does not need to be told that there is a basis for a valid fear of the aggressive doctrines of the Soviet Union. We have seen that aggressiveness expressed many times, beginning with the vested interest which communism displayed in prolonging the suffering of Western Europe after World War II. We have seen it most recently in the dangerous game of Soviet arms diplomacy in the Middle East and in the ruthlessness of the totalitarian repression in Hungary.

Certainly there is a basis for a deep concern with Soviet totalitarianism on the part of this country, on the part of free countries everywhere. There is

also, however, grave danger in a policy which would inflate this concern beyond actual proportions, whether the inflation derives from an excessive eagerness to obtain appropriations and increased Executive power or from simple miscalculation. The inflation is an invitation to a blind retreat into an irresponsible isolationism or to a blind advance into an equally irresponsible internationalism.

A policy based on a fear-laden inflation of the Soviet threat, in the not ve. long-run, can only lead as it has been leading to a fruitless search for absolute security, whether it be in a non-existent fortress America or non-existent Fortre: Free-World, and consequent actions of disillusionment, when it cannot be found. While this futile search is being pursued, we may well ignore the possibilities of making this nation relatively more secure than is now the case in what is and will always be a dangerous world.

The international problems of the United States and of freedom, Mr. President, did not begin with the birth of communist tyranny. They will not end with its inevitable passing. Yet the justifications for Executive actions that are presented to the Congress sometimes suggest that this distorted concept, obliviou: to several thousand years of human experience, does in fact dominate foreign poli

If the next stage in foreign relations is to be a constructive one, if the leadership of this country is to be prepared to begin the long and painful ascent to international stability, then fear as a predominant base of foreign policy must yie: to faith. I do not speak of faith in the rulers of the Russians. I do not speak even of an unquestioning faith in the governments of allied nations. The nature of Russian leadership leaves little margin for faith. As for allies, they are brought

together as their interests and ideals coverge; they may separate, if their interests and ideals should diverge.

I speak, rather, of faith in ourselves, in the people of this country. I speak of faith in the capacities of human freedom to meet the challenge of peace which, in this 20th Century, is the challenge of life itself.

It is high time, Mr. President, to express this faith in the policies of the nation. It is time to put aside the excess of fear that can only undermine the vitality of this country's freedom. It is time to recognize that if the Soviet Union is strong in a material sense, this nation is and can remain stronger, provided it is united and properly led. It is time to recognize that if there are dangers to freedom in the ideology of communism, there are even greater dangers to communism in the doctrines of liberty.

This shift in the attitude underlying policy, Mr. President, seems to me to be an essential prerequisite to progress towards a more durable peace, regardless of what the Russians may or may not do. If the leadership of this country reflects what I believe the people of this country feel we shall see this shift in the near future. We shall move from a holding action to a new stage of policy - to a policy of positive action for peace.

And if we are to have that kind of policy there are measures which can and must be taken both with respect to the machinery of policy and with respect to present policies themselves.

Improvements in the Machinery of Policy

At home, the gains made during the past few months in cooperation, between Democrats and Republicans and between the Executive and Legislative Branches must be consolidated. The continuance of this tripartisanship is essential if the maximum possible weight of this country is to be brought to bear on the international problems that confront us. Tripartisanship cannot be a casual arrangement, to be indulged in whenever the Executive Branch feels so disposed or when one party fears the political repercussions of a particular course of policy. If cooperation is casual, if it is given political overtones, we shall have more "slippage", if I may borrow a term from the Secretary of State, such as occurred in the sudden request a few weeks ago to send Senators to the London disarmament meetings and then the sudden postponement.

It seems to me, there is a way in which close and continuing cooperation between the Branches and between the parties can be maintained in foreign policy. It depends first of all on the will on all sides to cooperate, the will to avoid seeking partisan advantage or either Executive or Legislative domination in matters which affect the vital interests of this nation. If the will is present, then I believe the following actions will provide adequate machinery for continuance tripartisanship:

1. Let the President appoint able men of both parties to high policy-making positions in those agencies of the Executive Branch concerned with foreign relations. Surely if the sentiments of the people of the United States, as reflected in the party ratios in Congress are any indication, these appointments will include a few more qualified Democrats than is now the case.

2. Let the President and the Secretary of State, as a matter of regular practice, advise with the majority and minority leaders of both parties in the Senate and the Chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations in advance of all major decisions on foreign policy. When matters arise which are likely to involve action by the House of Representatives, then the corresponding Members of that body should be included.

In the end, the responsibility for decision in foreign policy, of course, must rest with the President. He cannot be bound by the advice he receives from the legislative members nor can he expect to bind the House or Senate until each has consented to any particular measure in a legislative act. Nevertheless, regular consultation of the kind I am suggesting can do much to avoid partisanship and to promote mutual understanding between the Branches in matters of foreign policy. It should be of advantage to the President. It should be of advantage to the Congress. Most of all it should be of value to the people of the United States who gain from an effective and united policy and who pay dearly for the converse. I emphasize that the consultation must be a regular and continuing practice, not a sometime gesture. It must take place, moreover, before, not after, the decisions are finally made by the President.

As for foreign aid, the improvements made possible by this year's Congressional inquiries and legislation must be carried out in spirit and in action by the Executive Branch. Unless this is done, the decay in this program will not finally be eliminated. Unless this is done, the dissents expressed in opposition to

foreign aid on the floor of the Senate this year may well become the majority opinion in the years ahead.

In the absence of significant changes in the international situation, there is every reason to expect a steady reduction in grants of foreign economic aid and an increase in the proportion of this program that is carried on a loan basis. There is every reason to expect that military aid will be adjusted more effectively to the actual needs of national defense and less to the predilections of the civilian and military bureaucracy of the Executive Branch and counterparts in other countries.

The President and the Congress must also see to it that not only the foreign aid program but the information program, the Central Intelligence Agency, and all other overseas activities are brought into close coordination with foreign policy. There has been improvement in this connection but much remains to be done. I believe we have seen ample evidence of how much remains to be done in the indecision, in the starts and stops, that have characterized the conduct of negotiations at London under Mr. Stassen.

The Department of State, under the President, is the logical and traditional place to center coordination of foreign policy. Does the Department shirk its responsibility or is it denied this responsibility? Is there something wrong in the organization of that Department which prevents it from exercising the responsibility? If that is the case it is incumbent on the President and the Congress to correct whatever it is that is wrong. It does not help to scatter

matters of foreign policy throughout the Executive Branch, to the point of irresponsibility. That is what we have had in recent years and that is why policy has so frequently bordered on the chaotic.

As it is now actions can be taken in innumerable places within the vast jungle of agencies of the Executive Branch, each with its extensive overseas operations, actions of the gravest consequence to this country. Yet it is virtually impossible to fix responsibility for the action without a Congressional investigation. Even with an investigation there is no certainty that the country will be able to obtain a satisfactory explanation and to prevent repetition.

Finally, Mr. President, I believe a concerted effort must be made to reduce the size of official establishments overseas - both military and civilian. Not only are these establishments costly in a monetary sense, but they can and are building an undercurrent of resentment towards this country in many countries. How many more demonstrations like those of the past months in Formosa and Lebanon and, most recently, in the Philippines, are waiting to be touched off by some explosive incident elsewhere?

The announced reduction of military forces in Japan is a step in the right direction and others should follow promptly. Has there been any reduction in the installation of thousands of official Americans on Formosa? Or now that the heat of the riots there has cooled will the Executive Branch operate on the assumption that the Congress, the people of the United States have also cooled in their determination to deal with this question?

I trust that if the Executive Branch chooses the path of inertia in this matter of the size of overseas installations, the Senate will not. I hope that the Armed Services Committee under its able Chairman the distinguished Senator from Georgia /Mr. Russell/ will give particular attention to this matter as it effects the military and that the Committee on Foreign Relations will study the problem as it involves civilian personnel overseas. Circumstances require us to maintain substantial numbers of military and civilian personnel abroad but let us make certain that these numbers are realistically adjusted to actual need.

Western Europe

I should like to turn now from the mechanics of policy to the substance of policy, to a consideration of measures which will support a positive policy for peace in various critical areas of the world. No single area is more important in this connection than Western Europe. No single factor is more essential than the preservation of the unity of Western Europe and the continuance of the close ties of the United States with the democracies of that region.

There is nothing new in these observations. They have been reiterated by successive Presidents, by successive Secretaries of States. They have been reaffirmed in repeated actions of the Congress. What is less evident, what requires repeated statement is that the military arrangements of Western European Union and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are no longer sufficient to maintain these ties. Whether it be a lessening of the fear of Soviet attack, whether it be the example set by this country, whether it be a growing

sense of futility in the light of advances in weapons technology or whether it be simple economic necessity, the mood and the actuality of disarmament now prevails in Western Europe. This mood, this actuality has made academic a good deal of the discussion of disarmament. We already have the beginnings of disarmament - one sided disarmament in advance of any agreement on the matter. There is no point in pretending that this is not the case. There is much to be said for facing this reality. There is much to be said for seeking to reinforce the essential intimacy of Western civilization by other means. This intimacy may prove of even greater importance in the long-run than a head-count of the men under arms in NATO.

Fortunately, the Europeans are moving to strengthen their own unity both in the field of nuclear energy and in the field of intra-European trade. The fate of Euratom and the European Common Market, now under consideration in the Parliaments of the European democracies, will have a great bearing on the progress and the peace of Western Europe and the world. While this country is not directly involved in these undertakings, our official attitudes with respect to them will have a highly significant bearing on their outcome.

If the Western Europeans do, in fact, pool their resources in a common effort to develop and exploit nuclear energy it will have profound repercussions for the United States. I need hardly remind the Senate that the initial development of the atomic bomb in this country during World War II drew heavily on the genius of scientists born in Europe. Without this contribution the race for this decisive weapon might have ended in another fashion. With the echoes of Soviet and British

tests of hydrogen bombs still reverberating and with developments in nuclear energy moving forward rapidly in France, Sweden and elsewhere, I need hardly remind the Senate that no country has a monopoly on the scientific talent in this field.

A pooled effort by Western European scientists and technicians under Euratom may well produce enormous new developments in nuclear energy. That could be a Godsend to the power-hungry countries of Europe and the world. It could make a great contribution to all mankind. It could be of great advantage to this country, provided we have established a sound pattern of cooperation with Euratom, provided we have not excluded ourselves from this great potential source of progress by inertia and by the limited vision of our leadership in these matters.

If the inertia is present and vision is absent, the vaults of the Atomic Energy Commission are likely to bulge with secrets that are no longer secret, with facts that are guarded only from the people of the United States. Meanwhile the scientific leadership of this country in nuclear energy may well vanish in the rapid flow of progress elsewhere. Little may remain to us except the smug assurances and the mysterious mumbo-jumbo that have masqueraded as leadership in this vital field.

As in the case of the development of unity in the nuclear field, the emergence of a common market in Western Europe will also have great significance for the economy of the United States. As the Senate knows, this country's largest volume of imports and exports are exchanged with the Western

European countries. Total trade is already approaching $10 billion a year. This trade is a not insignificant factor in the stability of our own economy, and it is a matter of vital necessity to many of the less powerful economies of Western Europe.

The United States stands to gain immeasurably in trade from the higher productivity and the higher levels of consumption that are likely to result from the development of a common market in Western Europe. On the other hand our trade can be seriously damaged by that development unless we establish mutually-advantageous relationships with the emerging common market.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that the time has come for the Congress as well as the Executive Branch to pay very close attention to these major trends towards integration in Western Europe. They are, I believe, eminently desirable developments from the point of view of this country. They have not only economic validity for Western Europe but great political implications as well. Like the European coal and steel community before them, they are safeguards against the narrow nationalistic rivalries in that region which have twice in our lifetime set fire to the world.

The interests of this country, it seems to me, require that we stay abreast of these developments pointing towards unity in Western Europe, that we encourage them, that we seek mutually-advantageous relationships with the institutions that are emerging through them. To that end, Mr. President, I suggest that the time may be ripe for a formal conference with the Member nations of Euratom and the European Common Market. In fact, the time may be ripe for conferences in these two fields among all the NATO members.

Eastern Europe

In Eastern Europe, Mr. President, we have opened a contact during the past few months which may prove of great long-range significance in the creation of conditions of stability throughout the entire continent. I refer to the loan agreement with Poland, to what may prove to be the beginnings of an affirmative policy with regard to all of Eastern Europe.

In substance, as the Senate knows, this agreement provides a line of credit of $95 million, to be used by the Poles largely for the purchase of wheat and cotton and coal mining machinery in this country. To make this loan was not an easy decision for the President/ or the Secretary of State. The loan is going to a country which has a government headed by Communists. It is going to a country in which Soviet military forces are present in large numbers. It is going to a country whose foreign policies are aligned with the Soviet Union.

In these circumstances there are obvious risks in the course that has been set. The commodities to be exported under the loan could be diverted to Soviet consumption despite safeguards against such a diversion and thus serve no useful end of the Polish people. They may help to make the Polish Communist regime more tolerable to the Poles. The loan may be defaulted, and in that case, we shall have given away, in effect, close to a hundred million dollars of products.

What is there to balance these real, these obvious risks? There is the fact that we are trading commodities which for the most part are in surplus in this country and for which we have every right to expect payment. There is the

fact that the present government of Poland has asserted a greater degree of independence of the Soviet Union in internal affairs than any of its predecessors. That government is in office by virtue of an election which most observers agree was the freest that Poland has had since World War II. It is a government that has made peace with religion. It is a government that has permitted some exercise of freedom of press and assembly.

and the Secretary of State
Had the President/not dealt with this government, is there not every likelihood that Poland would have gone the way of Hungary? Is there not every likelihood that the massacre of thousands of patriots would have been repeated? Is there not every likelihood that the refugees would have streamed out of Poland seeking a haven in this country or wherever else a sanctuary might be offered? And was there not every likelihood that in the end Poland would have found itself, as Hungary is now, under tighter Russian and Communist control, under a heavier boot of repression?

Some years ago, there was a great deal of loose talk about "liberation" of Eastern Europe. In the past year, we have seen the actual forces of liberation at work in two countries, in Hungary and in Poland. In the one, they have worked violently. In the other, violence has been minimal.

With respect to the first, Hungary, we have provided countless words of condolence for the martyrs of the uprisings. We have had U.N. resolutions of condemnation, sponsored by the United States and others, leveled at the Communist oppressors of the people. We have had a U.N. report condemning Soviet intervention. This body also passed a resolution on the subject by

unanimous vote. The President admitted thousands of refugees who fled from the terror of Budapest. The United States has spent tens of millions of dollars to care for these refugees and to move them to safe havens. All of these measures express deep sympathy on the part of the people of the United States and other free nations for the Hungarians who have been victimized by tyranny.

Have these measures, however, produced the liberation of Hungary? Or is the lid of oppression now sealed more tightly than ever? Is Hungary an example of the kind of liberation that those who used this term so glibly desire in Poland? In Rumania? In Czechoslovakia? In Bulgaria? In Albania?

Or is there not something to be said for the course that the President and the Secretary of State have now taken with respect to Poland? Is there not something to be said for a course which anticipates a gradual change in the political structure of Eastern Europe, through the working of internal forces, through the influence of peaceful trade and other contacts with free nations?

It seems to me that those in this country who object to the Administration's course in Poland must either recognize that they are indulging merely in vocal or other forms of protest while they let matters rest as they are in Eastern Europe or they must be prepared, in the last analysis, to shed the blood of Americans to change them.

I believe, as I have said on other occasions, it is a serious error to regard the region of Eastern Europe as a single entity, to be treated in foreign policy by identical measures. Each of these countries, now dominated by communism, has a set of unique national problems and unique national traditions.

Each country will grope for freedom in its own particular way, as we have seen in Yugoslavia, in Hungary and, as I believe, we are now seeing in Poland.

We do not serve the cause of freedom or the interests of this country when we blockade these Eastern European countries as a closed Communist corporation and merely seethe in the juice of our own moral indignation. In so doing we close only our own eyes and indulge ourselves in the luxury of self-righteousness.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that we have much more to gain and so too have the peoples of Eastern Europe if we extend our commercial, our diplomatic and other contacts with each country of that region as the occasion presents itself, rather than by attempting to deal with these peoples as a mass, in the abstract, and from afar. Let me make clear that I am not suggesting a hard-hitting, short-cut, sure-fire, policy for ending communism and building democracy overnight in Eastern Europe through an expansion in the operations of the aid program or the information program, or the C.I.A. or all three combined.

The countries of Eastern Europe, in varying degree, have been searching for secure national freedom and for popularly responsible government not only since the Communists have arrived but for decades and even centuries. They are not going to find these goals overnight, regardless of what we do or fail to do. What I am suggesting therefore is an approach of the open mind and critical and discriminating judgment. It seems to me that as a first step, the Secretary of State in his travels abroad might see fit to visit those countries of

Eastern Europe where he feels it may be useful to go and to bring back a report to the people of the United States on what is actually going on in them.

I make the suggestion not out of mere curiosity but because the situation in Eastern Europe, particularly as it involves Poland and Czechoslovakia, is highly relevant to the overriding problem of the stability of Europe. The Senate will recall that World War II was precipitated primarily by the forced collapse of the independence of these two nations. It is difficult to visualize how peace in Europe can now be built unless both countries regain a secure and independent national existence. I cannot see how they shall obtain such an existence without a substantial commercial, diplomatic and cultural contact with the nations to the West, including the United States. In its absence, they will inevitably remain closely tied to the Soviet Union. They will inevitably retain their vested interest in the Soviet policy of perpetuating the division of Germany. In that sense, especially, they will remain a continuing source of instability in Europe.

Frankly, I do not know, Mr. President, whether substantial contact with Eastern Europe is possible. A few years back, those nations themselves made that contact impossible, largely by their arrogant and irresponsible behavior towards citizens of the United States. There have been changes in this respect in Yugoslavia. There are now signs of other changes, particularly in Poland and, perhaps, there will be others elsewhere in the near future. I believe the Secretary of State could perform a highly useful service by a first-hand exploration of the significance of these changes.

The Far East

Turning to the other side of the globe, Mr. President, I should like to refer to a speech on China policy which the Secretary of State made in San Francisco on June 28. This was the fullest official treatment of the question that we have had in many months. It contained nothing new. It contained little with which this body would disagree, in the light of the various resolutions which have been adopted on Communist China in recent years.

The Senate has expressed itself many times in opposition to admitting Communist China to the United Nations; the Secretary reaffirmed the opposition in his speech. The Senate has expressed itself in opposition to the recognition of Peking; the Secretary reaffirmed this opposition. I supported these Senate resolutions. I believe they were sound resolutions.

It is not so much, therefore, with the content of the Secretary's speech that I find myself in disagreement. One could take issue, perhaps, with some of his reasoning and his assumptions of certain functions of moral judgment which more properly belong to the clergy and to history. In general, however, it is not what is included but what is omitted that is disturbing. After all, what has been the the principal issue related to China policy during the current session? Has it been the question of the admission of Communist China to the U.N. or the recognition of Peking? These questions have not been seriously at issue as far as I am aware. Yet the Secretary's remarks in San Francisco were largely a justification of the position he has taken on these questions.

Where in his speech, however, does the Secretary mention the ban which has been imposed on the press of the nation with regard to gathering the news in China? In a major statement of policy, the first on the subject in many months, the Secretary chose to omit reference to the one question that has been seriously at issue, to the one question that has raised serious doubts about China policy. His speech failed even to include mention of this very significant question. It did not make clear why the Administration has found it necessary to deny to the people of the United States a principal source of impartial information on one of the most complex and dangerous situations that this country has ever faced -- the source which could be provided by the public press of this nation.

Previously we had been told that the ban on travel of newsmen to the China mainland, in effect, was an essential element of high policy respecting the Far East. Rarely, in my years in Congress, however, have I heard weaker arguments presented by officials to support a view than those on this point which came from the Executive Branch.

We have been told by the Administration, moreover, that if the people are not satisfied with the information which the Executive Branch chooses to release on the China situation they can turn in effect to foreign newspapers who have representatives in China or that our press can hire correspondents from foreign countries to go to China. We have also been told, not by the Courts but by the Administration, that a free press, in effect, means freedom to publish the news but not to gather and verify it, that the right to gather and verify news, at least as far as international matters are concerned, is controllable by the Executive Branch.

Is it any wonder that the Secretary of State did not include a statement on this significant question in his remarks on China policy on June 28? Has there ever been a more invidious invitation to irresponsible and arbitrary government than the concept of the press in relation to foreign policy which the Executive Branch has advanced in this matter? A free press in foreign policy, Mr. President, no less than in other matters, is not a right to be granted or denied by any Administration. It is an absolute necessity for free government in this country. The press in foreign policy, as in other matters, is not a tool of government policy. It is an independent and essential check on that policy.

As one who has had occasion to find many times a greater accuracy in the nation's press than in the press releases of the Executive Branch -- under both Democratic and Republican Administrations -- as one who prefers the reports of the press and newsmen of this nation to those of the press and newsmen of foreign nations, I am compelled to take issue with the Administration on this question.

It is difficult enough for American correspondents to secure information abroad in the best of circumstances. The restrictions under which they work in many countries are too well known to require repetition. It is bad enough when the nation's press is hemmed in and prevented from the full exercise of its functions by the arbitrary acts of other governments. It is intolerable when its freedom is limited by the arbitrary action of the Executive Branch of our own government.

Legitimate representatives of the press of this nation must be free to go anywhere that they are able to go to bring back information which may be of value in informing the people of the United States. The press and the public, not the

Congress and certainly not the Executive Branch, must be the judge of where their representatives are to go and what news is of value.

If for reasons of high policy or other circumstances the Executive Branch cannot extend the sanction and protection of the passport, then it ought not to do so. If legitimate members of the press, however, are prepared to assume the very real risks of travel without the passport in order to gather the news, the are performing a courageous service on behalf of the people of the United States. It is indefensible for anyone in this government to seek to punish them for their courage.

There are reports of new stirrings, both ideological and popular, within Communist China. These reports come to us third-hand, fourth-hand and fifth-hand. They may have great significance or they may have little significance for the policies we are pursuing. Does the Senate have any idea of the accuracy of these reports or their implications? Does the Executive Branch? Yet the desire of the press of the nation to begin to get some first-hand facts on which independent evaluation of these reports, on which independent thought might be based is treated by the Executive Branch as something akin to a high crime. I am aware, Mr. President, that the Secretary has stated in press conferences that the question of permitting newsmen to go to China is under consideration. Is it a question, however, which needs to be placed "under consideration" -- under this government term which is so often synonomous with indecision and delay?

That, Mr. President, was one omission in the Secretary of State's speec in San Francisco. There was still another. Nowhere is there a discussion of the shift in British trade policy with respect to Communist China. Yet that has been one of the most significant developments in the Far Eastern situation in many months.

The United Kingdom has now lifted the ban on all exports of goods to China except for actual implements of war. How long will it be before other nations of Western Europe and Japan take the same path? What significance does this change have in the general situation in the Far East? What significance does it have for the long range interests of the United States in that part of the world?

The Senate does not have the answers to these questions. I doubt very much that the Executive Branch has the answers.

Mr. President, present policy with respect to China may or may not be adequate for safeguarding the interests of this country. We do not know. We do not know because that policy is gripped in a strait-jacket of government-enforced ignorance. For the first time in my recollection, public divorcement from independent access to the facts has been glorified by an Administration of this government as an essential element of foreign policy and of international morality.

I am hopeful that out of this divorcement will come a reconciliation. I have every confidence that Secretary Dulles will do what has not been done to date and that is to bring the China press coverage incident to a conclusion in the near future.

The Middle East

I turn next, Mr. President, to policies respecting the Middle East. Palliatives of various kinds have been applied in that region in recent months. They have helped to restore a measure of calm. The political fevers in the Middle East apparently have cooled or, in any event, are under better control. Before they begin to rise again, however, I believe it is essential that action be taken to get at the causes of the fever.

The basic problems of the Middle East, Mr. President, are little changed from what they long have been. Moreover, if the policy of this country continues to follow the grooves of ancient habit, it is likely to have little effect on these problems. We shall continue to under-write the major part of the cost of sustaining the Arab refugees as we have been doing for years at a cost of tens of millions of dollars a year in public funds. We shall continue to give some economic aid here, some military aid there, and be accused on all sides of miserliness or favoritism. We shall continue to rain outraged moral castigations on the heads of the Russians for doing what has been done by aggressive nations in that region for centuries -- fishing in troubled waters, as though this were the first time that it had happened. We shall continue to shower favors indiscriminately on the governments of the Middle East so long as they are vocally anti-Communist. We shall continue to give little consideration to whether or not these governments serve well and responsibly so that they might have some claim on the loyalties of their peoples as against the appeal of totalitarian communism. We shall continue to abhor the use of force while we

minimize the factors which may have provoked its use.

I do not wish to underestimate the complexity of the problems of the Middle East. I do not wish to overestimate the capacity of this government to resolve them. What is disturbing, however, is that these problems still contain the seeds of world conflict despite the surface calm in that region. What is disturbing is that we have spent untold sums of public funds and are likely to spend hundreds of millions of dollars more without perceptibly affecting these seeds of conflict. What is disturbing is that the Executive Branch does not appear to be particularly concerned by that prospect.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that if the people of this country are to be expected to support these expenditures in the Middle East for much longer, there had better be some evidence that the expenditures are not merely sustaining an indefinite holding action. There had better be some evidence that they are producing positive progress towards peace in the Middle East. The time has come, it seems to me, to establish a very close link between the destination of aid funds and the willingness of the recipients to contribute to a permanent solution of the problem of the Arab refugees and the right of peaceful transit of Suez and international waters in the region. The time has come to apportion these funds more than is now the case in terms of the degree of responsiveness of the various Middle Eastern governments to their people and their concern for the rights and welfare of their people. The time has come to apportion these funds more in terms of the degree to which the nations of the region show a readiness to work

for peace in the region rather than in terms of appeasement of the belligerent or in terms of their articulateness in proclaiming their anti-communism.

The time has come perhaps to seek international control over the arms traffic in that region, a traffic which is diverting the resources of the Middle East from the desperate needs of their peoples. The more arms are supplied to that region, the more instability is induced and the more that expenditures by the United States are required to maintain even a semblance of order. That is the formula the Soviet Union used to produce the crisis at Suez a few months ago. It is a formula that may now be making new crises in that region. I should very much like to see this country take the initiative in an attempt to alter it.

The Afro-Asian Nations.

I allude next, Mr. President, to the so-called less developed areas of the world, to the countries of Asia and Africa. Our policies, with respect to them, in broad outline, are in my opinion the kind of policies which are mutually advantageous and helpful. These policies support the concept of national freedom; they support the concept of economic growth; they support the concept of collective defense against totalitarian aggression.

The recent visit of the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations /Mr. Green/ and a subsequent journey by the Vice President to Africa did much to clarify the position of the United States with regard to that continent. Similar visits by members such as that of the distinguished Senator from Minnesota /Mr. Humphrey/ to the Middle East and by others to the Far East, have provided additional support for the position of this country.

Despite the effort of these Members, despite the excellence of the principles on which our policy is based, there is no denying the fact that our relations with the less-developed areas, in practice, have not been as satisfactor as they might be. There has been disappointment and criticism on our side. There has been suspicion and criticism on theirs.

Some friction is unavoidable in the relations between all nations. It seems to me, however, that the administration of our policies abroad has contributed unnecessarily to this friction. There have been inept statements by various spokesmen of the Administration. In an anxiety to convince the Afro-Asian nations of the good intentions of the United States, moreover, the Executive Branch, I believe, has sometimes gone too far. It has overloaded ther with public relations. It has overloaded them, in some cases, with aid, military and economic. It has overloaded them with officials, military and civilian.

The rioting on Formosa, the anti-American demonstration in the Philippines and elsewhere are warnings that should not go unheeded. They are warnings that the amount of official activity undertaken by this country is not a measure of sound relations.

This warning has been raised many times in the past by Members of this body, who have travelled abroad. Yet it has gone unheeded in the Executive Branch.

<u>If there are to be sound relations with the Afro-Asian nations they are not going to be purchased relations. They are not going to be relations induced</u>

by the legerdemain of public relations. They are not going to be relations built on military assistance which raises the levels of armed forces far beyond the capacity of the peoples of other countries to support. They are not going to be relations built on verbal professions of friendship. They are not going to be relations built by substituting our efforts for the efforts of others, our initiative for an initiative which must come from elsewhere.

What is needed above all, Mr. President, is an administration of policies affecting the less-developed which makes clear that we regard these nations as co-equal, in fact as well as in words. We need, in practice, an information program that seeks to inform not to saturate. We need a Point Four program which encourages people-to-people technical exchange on a mutual basis. We need strong exchange-of-persons programs, two-way exchanges. We need an economic aid-program on a repayable basis that promotes economic independence and responsibility, a program that promotes self-growth not continuing dependency on this country. We need a military aid program which is rationally adjusted to the total strategy of defense against aggression, not a program which might make it convenient for irresponsible governments, in the name of anti-communism, to evade their responsibilities to their peoples by the aid-reinforced strength of their armies and police. We need official United States representation in these countries kept to a reasonable size. We need representatives who reflect in their conduct the sincerity and the democracy of this country, not the pretenses of a dying colonialism. Congress has done a great deal of what can be done to provide a legislative basis for sound friendly and mutually advantageous ties with the

less-developed countries. It is up to the Executive Branch to administer this legislation in a fashion which does in fact produce such ties.

Latin America

Respecting our relations with the other Republics of the Americas, a positive approach to peace requires, not so much a revision of policy as it does a more dynamic expression of policy. Whether it is called "Good Neighbor" or "Good Partner", the policy of the United States ought constantly to be kept abreast of the changing situation in the countries of Latin America. It ought constantly to seek out ways, new ways for advancing the common interests of the hemisphere, our interests and the interests of the "Good Neighbors" or "Good Partners".

Mr. President, the situation is changing in other parts of the Americas and it is changing rapidly. The economic growth of many Latin American countri countries in the past decade has been phenomenal. With it, has come a growing national consciousness. With it, has come an increasing impatience with self-seeking, ruthless dictatorship. With it has come a spreading determination to obtain responsible governments capable and willing to serve the needs of all. Our policy needs to be tuned to these developments more acutely than is now the case. It needs to be tuned to the rising voice of the people of Latin America and to treat, with appropriate scepticism, those who seek to drown out that voice.

In a situation of change such as now exists in Latin America, the opportunities are present to develop closer ties in commerce and in culture, among all the nations of this hemisphere. Opportunities exist to do many things in

common with the Latin American countries, which will enrich the lives of the peoples of all the American republics. Even the basic machinery exists to capitalize on these opportunities, in the Organization of the American States.

What is lacking it seems to me is a realistic appraisal of the opportunities and the initiative to seize them. Suggestions have been advanced in the Senate and elsewhere pointing out avenues of cooperation which, at the least, are worthy of the fullest exploration. I should like to revive at this time two such proposals which I made last year. One called for an exploration of the possibilities of establishing a University of the Americas, perhaps in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The virtues of that island, as a kind of showcase of enlightened democratic progress, have recently been discovered by some of the spokesmen for the Administration. They have found that Puerto Rico has made extraordinary advances in the past two decades, that it is a natural point of fusion for all of the cultures of the Americas. I, personally, should like to see a study made to determine whether it or some other centrally located place, might house a great University which would foster the interchange of the wisdom and experience of all the nations of this Hemisphere.

I also suggested last year that the time may be coming to shift a greater part of the responsibility for the Point Four technical assistance program in this hemisphere from a bi-lateral basis to a common endeavor of the Organization of American States. If this change were made the burden of the costs of the

program might well be spread more equitably and the material returns from it to all the American republics might be greatly increased. The intangible gains in goodwill and in the unity of the Americas, moreover, might be even more valuable. I do not know whether such a change is feasible. I do know, however, that nothing would be lost in exploring the possibility, exploring it seriously with the other American republics.

Similarly, there are other ideas which have been advanced in recent years that merit the fullest consideration. Among these have been proposals for a regional development bank and, more recently, for regional trade arrangements.

It may be, Mr. President, that in the field of Latin American relations, as in others, the Senate through its members and Committees must seek to supply the initiative which the Executive Branch lacks. In at least one instance that has already been the case. Amendments introduced by the distinguished Senator from Florida /Mr. Smathers/ have done much to insure more adequate consideration of Latin America in the operations of the Foreign Aid Program.

The Soviet Union

Before concluding, Mr. President, I refer to our relations with the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that this question transcends all other issues of foreign policy.

What is the state of these relations, Mr. President? They are relations characterized in official circles by fear, suspicion, hatred, bitterness, and

pettiness, not on the Russian side alone, not on this side alone, but on both sides. They are relations held together by the slenderest thread of contact, by a minimum of civility.

Yet on that contact, on that civility hangs the peace of the world. On that contact, on that civility rests the fate of mankind. More than once, the thread has been stretched to the breaking point. Each time the crisis has abated. Each time the thread has held. It has held, I believe, because to contemplate a final rupture of the thread is to contemplate neither the annihilation of totalitarian communism alone, nor of free democracy alone, but the end of human civilization as we have known it. Even the most ruthless of authoritarians shrink from that prospect.

It may not always be so, Mr. President. A miscalculation, an act of madness can sever the thread. There is no assurance that this so-called "Peace of mutual terror" will last forever. The fact is that this so-called peace is not peace at all. It is a desperate clinging by fingertips to survival. It is a tortured dance of diplomacy on the edge of the abyss. It is a trembling light of hope in an encircling darkness of unspeakable disaster.

Can we fix a firmer grip on survival? Can we find a more secure path on which to walk? Can we strengthen the light? Can we, in short, build a more stable and secure peace than the peace of "mutual terror"?

Earlier in these remarks, Mr. President, I expressed the view that there never has been and probably never will be an absolute security for this nation or any nation. There are, however, degrees of insecurity. The individual

pursuit of absolute security by this nation, no less than the Soviet Union has led both nations close to the maximum permissible degree of insecurity, short of the total insecurity of nuclear war.

The level of insecurity has risen, despite the expenditures of hundreds of billions of dollars by both sides to maintain swollen armed forces. It has risen, despite phenomenal advances in the scientific technology of war and defense - even to the point of the almost-pure bomb - the 96% pure bomb - the bomb that kills without the prolonged agony of radioactive poisoning. The insecurity has risen despite ten years of diplomatic jockeying for bases, for allies and propagandistic advantage.

What have we to show for this enormous output of human energy? What have the Russians to show for it? Is the world better off? Are the Russians? Are we? At most, Mr. President, the most that we can say is that we have perhaps managed to keep the Russians a little more insecure than we are ourselves.

I do not suggest, Mr. President, that we could have done anything much differently than we have during the past ten years. The universal forces which set in motion fears among whole peoples are still beyond human grasp. Once they are in motion, there is no turning them aside until they have run their course. Governments must deal with the day-to-day eruptions which these fears produce. If military strength elsewhere threatens the safety of this nation what else is there to do but to develop counterstrength? If aggressive diplomacy and

propaganda mark us as the target for eventual annihilation or the source of all evil, do we have any choice but to respond in kind?

No, Mr. President, I cannot suggest that we go back and relive this past decade of Soviet-American relations in another way even if that were possible. What I do suggest is that we look carefully at where we are now. I suggest that we ask ourselves whether there is another road, not to the goal of absolute security, but to the goal of relatively greater security for this nation and other nations than is now enjoyed by any nation. Is there, in short, a road to a more stable peace?

I do not know, Mr. President, whether or not such a road exists. As I noted earlier in my remarks, it is not for us alone to find it. The attitudes which underlie Soviet policy are obviously a key factor. In this connection, the recent political upheavals in Russia and the eastern European countries may facilitate or impede the search.

Regardless of the effect of these changes, however, I believe the road to peace will not be found in another broad Summit Conference which obscures the hard realities of peacemaking under the glittering generalities of peace.

It will not be found in a fruitless search for an all-embracing disarmament agreement which will guarantee in one stroke the absolute security of this nation and all nations - a search which seeks to take the last step first.

It will not be found in propaganda campaigns of mutual hate or even mutual love between ourselves and the Russians.

It will not be found in policies and attitudes, whether Russian or our own which put a premium on ignorance of the facts about each country among the people of the other.

It will not be found in a competition for the placing of petty restrictions on the officials of each country who must reside in the other to carry on the legitimate business of their governments, and I stress the word legitimate.

It will not be found, this road to peace, if either side assumes that any concession to the other is in itself a sign of weakness or that any refusal to grant a concession is in itself, an indication of strength - and the more adamant or belligerent the refusal, the greater the strength.

It will not be found, finally, unless the policies of this country and the Soviet Union recognize that the road to peace is infinitely to be preferred to the continuing vergency and the ultimate calamity of nuclear war.

If it is not to be found in these ways, Mr. President, where then are we to look for the road to a more durable peace? Once again, Mr. President, I must emphasize that peace does not depend on the actions of this nation alone. The most that we can do is to pursue policies which will lead to peace if, in fact, circumstances are ripe for it and others are prepared for it. I reiterate that the key factor from the point of view of our own foreign policy is a greater reflexion in that policy of the positive faith of the people of the United States.

Only the President, with such assistance as the Congress may be able to give him, is in a position to make that faith felt in official action. It is to the President that the people must turn for an assertion of that faith in the nation's foreign policy.

If the President provides the essential leadership then the first steps towards a more durable peace have already been outlined by the distinguished majority leader /Mr. Johnson/ in his address in New York several weeks ago. If the President provides the essential leadership he will see to it that these proposals are not lost in the labyrinths of the Executive bureaucracy. These were not complex and improbable proposals which the able majority leader advanced. They were simple, reasonable proposals of a nature that expressed the faith and confidence of the people of the nation. They cut through the endless prattle about peace and showed the way to action for peace.

The proposals called for an interchange of contact by radio, TV, and other media between the people of the United States and Russia. They called for a small bite at the problem of control of arms, a cautious but very real bite, rather than a mouthful of platitudes about the blessings of the elusive goal of disarmament.

They were, in short, proposals which were designed to make clear that the United States did not fear to lift the Iron Curtain, if the Russians were prepared to raise it. They were proposals designed to make clear that the United States understood the fears of the world concerning nuclear weapons and was prepared for international action which would reflect that understanding.

These were eminently sound proposals, Mr. President, and to them, I would add one more at this time.

It seems to me high time for an end to the petty restrictions which the Soviet Union has placed on the reasonable freedom of movement of our official representatives in that country and the reciprocal restrictions which we have placed on theirs in this country.

If mature officials of both countries insist upon behaving like schoolboys in this limited matter, how are they to be expected to deal with the complex problems of war and peace? I would like to see this government confident enough and big enough to take the lead in trying to restore, on a reciprocal basis, the treatment of official representatives in both countries to a decent level of civility.

Concluding Comments

Mr. President, I have made these lengthy remarks today because within a few weeks, the Congress will probably stand in adjournment until the new year. The months ahead, when we are away from the capital, will be decisive months. They may witness new crises which will again stretch the thin thread of peace. Or the coming months may mark the beginnings of a new stage of foreign policy. It may be a stage in which the words of peace which echo from all nations are translated into actions of peace by all nations. It may be a stage in which the President embarks, not on a crusade for peace, but on a rational search for ways of reflecting more accurately the attitudes of the people of the United States in the policy of the United States, a search for ways of reflecting less the fears and uncertainties with which we live and more the faith and the confidence which underlie the freedom and greatness of this country.

If the President does pursue that kind of policy, consistently and firmly, he shall not lack for support in this body. He shall not lack for support among the people of the United States. He shall, in fact, mobilize that support and the support of many nations to meet the great challenge of the remaining years of this century. That challenge, Mr. President, is to turn mankind from the dangerous flirtation with human extinction which now goes on, to the work of constructing the free institutions and the durable relations which will make possible a decent life, a decent fulfillment for the people of this nation and all nations.

That is the challenge which confronts us, Mr. President. It is a challenge of faith and of action. We can meet that challenge. We must not, at our peril, fail to meet it.